In this paper, a characterization of authentication codes in terms of bipartite graphs is given. By using such a characterization, two necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy are derived. The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack are discussed. As a result, some (optimal) minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy are constructed from association schemes, from finite groups or from known authentication codes no matter whether the known ones are with or without secrecy.
Introduction
Two of the main applications of cryptography are the provision of secrecy and/or authentication for messages. Shannon [18] introduced the theory of unconditional secrecy. Simmons [19] developed an analogous theory of unconditional authentication. Massey [14] put the two theories in a common setting and drew parallels between them. Let S, E and M be three non-empty sets and let f : S × E → M be a map. The four tuple A = (S, E, M; f ) is called an authentication code [19] if for each e ∈ E, the map f (·, e) : S → M defined by s → f (s, e) is injective.
For an authentication code A = (S, E, M; f ), we say that the sets S, E and M are the set of source states, the set of encoding rules, and the set of messages, respectively. The map f is called the encoding map. If m = f (s, e) for s ∈ S, e ∈ E and m ∈ M, then we say that the source state s is encoded into the message m by using the encoding rule e, and that for convenience, the message m is valid under the encoding rule e. The cardinalities |S|, |E| and |M| are called the size parameters of the code. An authentication code with the size parameters |S| = k, |E| = b and |M| = v is simply denoted by an AC(k, b, v).
Authentication codes are used in communication channels where, besides the transmitter and the receiver, there may be individuals who want to deceive the receiver by either impersonating or substituting messages. To protect against these deceits, the transmitter-receiver may use an authentication code which is publicly known and choose a fixed encoding rule e which is known only by the transmitter and the receiver. The set of information which the transmitter would like to transmit to the receiver should be identified with the set of source states of the code. Suppose that the transmitter wants to send a source state s to the receiver. To do this, the transmitter first encodes s into a message m using the chosen encoding rule e, i.e., m = f (s, e), and then sends m to the receiver. After receiving a message m , the receiver first has to judge whether m is authentic, i.e., whether m is valid under the fixed encoding rule e. If m is valid under e, then m is regarded as authentic and can be decoded by e to get the unique source state s such that m = f (s , e). Otherwise, m is regarded as a false one and is rejected by the receiver.
For any e ∈ E, let M(e) = { f (s, e)|s ∈ S} be the set of valid messages under e. Therefore the map f (·, e) is a bijection from S onto M(e). Let f e denote the inverse map of f (·, e). Furthermore, for any m ∈ M, let E(m) = {e ∈ E| m ∈ M(e)}. That is, E(m) is the set of encoding rules under which m is valid.
Several characterizations of authentication codes have been obtained by combinatorial designs [3, 16, 17, 21] or by error-correcting codes [15] . In this paper, a characterization of authentication codes in terms of bipartite graphs is given. By using such a characterization, two necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy are derived. The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack are discussed. As a result, some (optimal) minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy are constructed from association schemes, from finite groups or from known authentication codes no matter whether the known ones are with or without secrecy.
Impersonation and substitution attacks
Suppose that there are independent probability distributions on the set S of source states and on the set E of encoding rules. We write p S (s) and p E (e) for the a priori probabilities of occurrence of the source state s ∈ S and the encoding rule e ∈ E, respectively. The probability of a message to occur is completely dependent on the associated probabilities for source states and encoding rules. Therefore, for every m ∈ M, we always have that
We require that for every source state s, p S (s) > 0, for every encoding rule e, p E (e) > 0, and for every message m, p M (m) > 0. This can easily be achieved by simply removing from the sets under consideration those source states, encoding rules, and messages with probability 0 of occurrence. That is, the encoding map is assumed to be surjective. Moreover, we write p S|M (s|m) for the conditional probability that source state s occurs if it is known that message m was sent.
We assume that the deceiver has the ability to impersonate the transmitter to send messages to the receiver, or to tamper with the message sent by the transmitter. By impersonation it means that the deceiver sends a message through the channel to the receiver and hopes that the receiver will accept it as authentic, i.e., as a message sent by the transmitter. By substitution it means that after the deceiver intercepts a message sent by the transmitter to the receiver, he/she sends another message instead and hopes that the receiver will accept it as authentic. The objective of the deceiver is to choose a message and send it to the receiver so that the probability of deceiving the receiver, i.e., of causing the receiver to accept a message not sent by the transmitter as authentic, is as large as possible. We denote by P I and P S , respectively, the largest probabilities that the deceiver could deceive the receiver by impersonating and by substituting a message. We call them the probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack, respectively. In other words, it is defined that
p E (e), and P S = max
where p M (m |m) is the probability that the message m is valid given that m has been observed.
Remark. Some authors choose to define P S as an average over the set of possible legitimate messages rather than a maximum [3, 16, 19] . Lower bounds on P I and P S and lower bounds on the number of encoding rules can be found in [3, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22] .
Throughout this paper we assume that the set of source states and the set of encoding rules have a uniform probability distribution. Then it is easy to deduce that
Count the number of pairs (e, m), such that e ∈ E, m ∈ M and e ∈ E(m) in two ways, so that we get
Therefore there exists an m ∈ M such that |E(m)| ≥ bk/v, which implies that 
Authentication codes and bipartite graphs
Let G be a simple undirected graph with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). For any vertex v ∈ V (G), the neighbor of v, denoted by N (v), is the set of vertices which are adjacent to v. The cardinality of N (v) is called the degree of v. A graph G is called regular if every vertex of G has the same degree. A graph G is bipartite (with bipartition (X, Y )) if the vertex set V (G) can be partitioned into two subsets X and Y so that every edge has one end in X and one end in Y . A subset M of E(G) is called a matching in the graph G if no two of its elements are adjacent in G.
A matching M is called a maximum one if G has no matching M with |M | > |M|, and M is perfect if every vertex of G is incident with some edge in M. For more information on graphs, the reader is referred to Bondy and Murty [2] .
Let A = (S, E, M; f ) be an AC(k, b, v). Construct a graph G(A) as follows:
Then G(A) is a bipartite graph and the degree of every vertex in E is k. It is called the bipartite graph induced from A. Conversely, suppose that G is a bipartite graph with bipartition (X, Y ) and the degree of every vertex in X is k. Given an arbitrary set S with k elements. For each x ∈ X , let e x be a bijection from S to N (x). Set E = X and M = Y . Define the encoding map f as f (s, x) = e x (s) for s ∈ S and x ∈ E. Then A(G) = (S, E, M; f ) is an AC(k, |X |, |Y |). This authentication code is called the induced one from the graph G.
Note that the bipartite graph induced from an authentication code is unique. But there are (k!) |X | authentication codes induced from one bipartite graph since there are k! choices for each e x . Two authentication codes
f 2 ) are said to be homovalid if they are induced from the same bipartite graph. The reason is that for any e ∈ E 1 = E 2 , M 1 (e) = M 2 (e) = N (e), i.e., the sets of valid messages under the same encoding rule of these two authentication codes are the same. Moreover, if authentication codes A 1 and A 2 are homovalid, then for any m ∈ M 1 = M 2 , we have E 1 (m) = E 2 (m) = N (m). Therefore the following theorem on homovalid authentication codes is immediate.
Theorem 2. Homovalid authentication codes induce the same bipartite graph and homovalid authentication codes have the same probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack.
Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy
Godlewski and Mitchell [8] gave the definition of several cryptosystems with secrecy (such as
and the characterization of such systems with minimum number of encoding rules. In the following, the definition and some results on U (L)-secrecy are reviewed.
A subset M of M is allowable if there exists an encoding rule e such that M ⊆ M(e). 
Theorem 4 ([8]). Let (S,
Proof. Suppose that G is a k-regular bipartite graph of order 2n with bipartition (X, Y ). It is clear that |X | = |Y | = n. By Konig's Theorem [13] , the graph G is k-edge-colorable. Let G be edgecolored by k different colors, say c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c k . Set S = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c k }, E = X and M = Y . For any x ∈ X = E, define e x : S → N (x) by e x (s) = m for any s ∈ S, where {x, m} is an edge of the graph G colored by s. Then, e x is a bijection which implies that A(G) = (S, E, M; f ) is an authentication code as in Section 3. Moreover, for any m ∈ M and any s ∈ S, there is a unique edge incident with m which has color s. The other end of this edge is an encoding rule e satisfying m = f (s, e). By Theorem 4, the constructed authentication code is a minimal one with perfect secrecy.
In [21] , the technique of using edge-colorings of graphs to construct authentication codes was used. From the proof of Theorem 5, the main step for constructing a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy from a regular bipartite graph G is giving an edge-coloring of this graph. There are a number of specific and relatively simple algorithms to find a maximum matching E 1 (with k edges) in G. For example, the breadth-first phased maximum matching algorithm runs in O(kn 3 2 ) time on a k-regular bipartite graph G with 2n vertices to find a maximum matching [9] . We paint the edges of this matching with color c 1 . Then consider the (k − 1)-regular bipartite graph obtained by deleting the edges of E 1 from G, and repeat the procedure. Thus an edgecoloring of the bipartite graph G can be obtained in O(k 2 n 3 2 ) time, i.e., in a polynomial time in n. Noting that we always assume that k v for an AC(k, b, v), so k should be sufficiently smaller than n.
Suppose that A is an authentication code whose induced bipartite graph G(A) is regular. Then a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy A can be constructed from this graph. That is, the two codes A and A are homovalid. This proves the following theorem. 
Construction of minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy
From Theorem 5, the construction of minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy is equivalent to the construction of regular bipartite graphs. In this section, we show how to derive minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy from association schemes, from finite groups or from known authentication codes.
Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy derived from association schemes
Let X be a finite set, and let R i (0 ≤ i ≤ d) be subsets of X × X satisfying the following conditions:
, the number of z ∈ X such that (x, z) ∈ R i and (z, y) ∈ R j is independent of the choices of x and y whenever (x, y) ∈ R k . This number is denoted by
Then the configuration χ = (X, {R i } 0≤i≤d ) is called an association scheme [1] on the set X with d associate classes. Non-negative integers p k i j (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d) are called the intersection numbers of the association scheme χ .
Let k i = p 0 ii , i.e., the number of z ∈ X such that (x, z) ∈ R i for a fixed x ∈ X . It is independent of the choice of x and is called the valency of R i . The numbers n = |X |, k i and p k i j (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d) are called the parameters of the association scheme χ .
Authentication codes constructed by association schemes with 2 associate classes were given in [20] . In this subsection, a general construction of authentication codes based on association schemes is presented. Let χ = (X, {R i } 0≤i≤d ) be an association scheme with parameters n, k i ,
Construct a bipartite graph, having bipartition (X, X ), where {x, y}(x, y ∈ X ) is an edge if and only if (x, y) ∈ R . It is clear that this graph is a regular bipartite graph with valency k . Therefore, a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy can be derived from this graph by Theorem 5. Now let m 1 , m 2 ∈ X be two distinct valid messages under an encoding rule and let (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ R j . Then the number of encoding rules under which m 1 and m 2 are valid simultaneously is equal to the number of z ∈ X such that (z, m 1 ) ∈ R and (z, m 2 ) ∈ R . This number is p j . That is, |E(m 1 ) ∩ E(m 2 )| = p j .
From Eq. (2) in Section 2, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 9. Assume that there is an association scheme with parameters n, k i , p k i j (0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ d). For any with k > 1, there is a minimal AC(k , n, n) with perfect secrecy and the probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution of the code are
Example. Let A be an alphabet of q symbols {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. Let X be the set of all m-tuples of elements of A. For x, y ∈ X and 0 ≤ i ≤ m, define (x, y) ∈ R i if and only if x and y differ in just i coordinates. Then (X, {R i } 0≤i≤m ) is an association scheme with m associate classes. This scheme is called the Hamming scheme. Setting = 1, the corresponding parameters of this scheme are respectively. When m = 2 and q = 4, we get a minimal optimal AC(6, 16, 16) with perfect secrecy.
Example. Let F q be the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of an odd prime. Choose a fixed non-square element z of F * q . Let n = 2ν + δ, δ = 0, 1 or 2. (Here we allow two different expressions of even n.) Put
where I (ν) is the identity matrix of order ν and
Let ν ≥ 2, and let v 0 be a fixed isotropic vector in the (2ν + δ)-dimensional orthogonal space
Define relations on X as follows: for x, y ∈ X , (x, y) ∈ R 0 if x = y, (x, y) ∈ R i if xS δ y T = g i , 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, where g is a fixed primitive element of F q , and (x, y) ∈ R q if x = y and xS δ y T = 0. Then χ = (X, {R i } 0≤i≤q ) is an association scheme with q associate classes (see [5] ). For example, if = q, then we have a minimal AC(k q , n, n) with perfect secrecy, where
The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution of this code are
respectively. Moreover, when either ν > 3 or ν = 2, 3 with δ = 1, 2, the code is nearly optimal.
Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy derived from finite groups
From any k-regular graph, we can get a k-regular bipartite graph by the following covering technique.
Let G be a k-regular graph with vertex set V (G) = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. Construct graph G as Theorem 10. If there is a k-regular graph G with n vertices, then there is a minimal AC(k, n, n) with perfect secrecy. Furthermore, this authentication code has P S = 1/k if and only if there is no 4-cycles in the graph G.
From any finite group, a regular graph can be constructed as follows. Let Γ be a finite group and let S be a subset of Γ such that 1 ∈ S and for any s ∈ S, s −1 ∈ S. The Cayley graph Cay(Γ , S) on Γ with connector set S is defined as V (Cay(Γ , S)) = Γ and two vertices g and h are adjacent if and only if g −1 h ∈ S. It is clear that Cay(Γ , S) is an |S|-regular graph with |Γ | vertices. Using the covering technique, regular bipartite graphs can be constructed by this Cayley graph Cay(Γ , S). Therefore, minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy can be obtained from finite groups.
Example. Let q be an odd prime power, and let F q be the finite field with q elements. Then the set Γ = F q × F q with operation
becomes a group of order q 2 with identity (0, 0) [10] . Let S be a line from the affine plane AG(F q ) which are not through the point (0, 0). That is, given that a, b ∈ F q with (a, b) = (0, 0) and c ∈ F * q , S = {(x, y)|ax + by = c}. Then the Cayley graph Cay(Γ , S) is a q-regular graph with q 2 vertices. Therefore an AC(q, q 2 , q 2 ) with perfect secrecy is constructed. The probabilities of a successful impersonation and of a successful substitution attack of it are P 0 = P 1 = 1/q. It is an optimal minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy.
Minimal authentication codes with perfect secrecy derived from known authentication codes
The encoding matrix [21] of an AC(k, b, v) is a b × k matrix, where the rows are indexed by encoding rules, the columns are indexed by source states, and the entry in row e and column s is the message m = f (s, e). So, the set of entries in row e is just M(e). It is clear that an authentication code is uniquely determined by its encoding matrix. An authentication code is called Cartesian if any message m observed in the channel determines a unique source state s. In other word, for any message m, there is a unique source state s such that m = f (s, e) for any e ∈ E(m). A Cartesian authentication code provides no secrecy. Many constructions of Cartesian authentication codes have appeared (see [4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 21, 23, 24] ).
From Theorem 7, if A is an AC(k, v, v) such that P I = k/v, then there is a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy A which is homovalid to A. In fact, the encoding matrix of A can be got from that of A by reordering the entries in each row suitably. From Section 4, we know that this can be done in a polynomial time in v. Therefore, from any Cartesian AC(k, v, v) with P I = k/v which provides no secrecy, a minimal authentication code with perfect secrecy can be constructed. Moreover, they have the same probabilities of successful attacks.
Example. By Theorem 2 of [6] , for any prime power q, and any positive integers ν and s, there is a Cartesian AC(q 2s(ν−s) , q s(2ν−s) , q s(2ν−s) ). Thus, there is a minimal
